The deal record shows where recorded financing stops but cannot show why. Practitioner interviews describe support with no formal graduation date, and most explanations for a stalled round remain untested until portfolio founders and external investors are interviewed.
In practitioner accounts, studio support tapers with no formal graduation point
Practitioner interviews describe a model with no cohorts and no graduation date (Exhibit 35), and Exhibit 36 draws the taper they describe. The report’s milestone, the first external round, is observable in the deal record, though studios do not necessarily treat it as the end of support.
| Feature | What practitioners describe |
|---|---|
| Structure and duration | No cohorts and no formal graduation date. Deep, bespoke support for 24 to 36 months, reviewed at month 24 and extendable. |
| Later phase and end point | From year three, the studio stops producing materials for the company and helps it reach investors using the company’s own materials. Support can continue after spin out, and companies never fully leave until exit. The first external round after the studio’s investment is the cleanest available marker, though imperfect, because studios do not build only from scratch. |
Practitioner interviews, October 2026 (Annex C). The account describes studio practice as reported in interviews and does not establish a pattern across the industry. Source: interviews, October 2026.
Schematic drawn from the practitioner accounts in Exhibit 35. The intensity of support is illustrative and was not measured. The dashed segment shows an extension after the month 24 review, and the arrow involvement that continues to exit.
Source: interviews, October 2026.
The first external round therefore marks a financing event, and studio support continues after it. It needs no studio cooperation and matches a marker proposed in the interviews. The round may predate the studio’s involvement in a company it invested in, and the deal record does not date that involvement. Time to first round runs from launch, so it measures company age at that round. It does not measure the length of support.
Eleven possible bottlenecks, none yet tested with founders or external investors
Eleven mechanisms could stall a first round (Exhibit 37). They are hypotheses, unranked and not exhaustive, and only one finds indirect support in the deal data.
| Bottleneck | What it looks like | What the evidence shows |
|---|---|---|
| Growth capital gap | Early rounds close, but few investors, and few African ones, write later rounds | African investors hold 9% of named participations at Series B and 4% after, and 52% of funded companies have no recorded round in two years. Indirectly consistent, though neither measure establishes the cause |
| No lead investor | Several soft commitments, with nobody willing to price the round | Announcements name a lead in 23 of 69 multi-investor first rounds, and the record cannot show how often a round lack one |
| Cap table objection | An investor raises the studio’s shareholding as a negotiating term | Raised in practitioner interviews (Chapter 5), not yet tested with external investors |
| Cross-border structure | Investors ask for a holding company outside the country before investing in larger rounds | Described in published reporting from Tunisia and Egypt, untested in the deal data |
| Further hypotheses | Incumbent cap table (talks with existing shareholders stall the round), slow documentation after an investor decides, studio dependency (core functions still inside the studio), reporting gap (accounts rebuilt for diligence), governance gap (no independent oversight of the chief executive), thin traction (retention or margin not yet evidenced) and runway compression (terms accepted under cash pressure). Each awaits founder and investor evidence. | |
Bottlenecks may differ by build route. An incumbent cap table is most likely where other shareholders preceded the studio, as in companies it invested in, and studio dependency where the studio still runs core functions, as in builds. Testing this needs the built, co-created or invested tag in Chapter 9, with each studio’s stake and date of involvement.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal (Chapters 4 and 5), interviews (Annex C), reporting cited in Chapter 5 and authors’ analysis.
Where rounds stall therefore remains a set of testable hypotheses, and the one indirectly consistent with the deal data points to a shallow pool of later stage investors. Chapter 8 sets out what funders, studios, investors and policymakers can act on now, and what they should test first.
