Funding rates are also higher at more visible studios and in stronger regional markets, and interviews suggest a large studio stake can make outside investors more cautious. None of these is yet proven to cause higher funding.
Studios with their own funds are associated with higher funding rates
Portfolio entries at studios with their own funds reach an external round at 52 percent, against 17 percent at single entity studios, using the FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter structural classification.24 The gap holds when studios themselves are compared, with median funding rates of 50 and 7.8 percent, and after allowing for region, where the odds are almost six times as high. This is the report’s most robust finding. The gap remains significant after correcting for multiple tests and for clustering within studios (Exhibit 40), and persists without the largest portfolio, at 45 percent (Exhibit 29).
January 2019 to September 2026. n is the number of portfolio entries, so a company listed by two studios counts under each. The 95% confidence interval is 44% to 60% for studios with their own funds and 12% to 22% for single entity studios. The authors assigned structures using the FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter classification, in which studios with their own funds are dual entity studios with an internal fund and single entity studios are single entity holding companies. Excludes one sidecar fund studio (nine entries)
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal; authors’ directory and analysis.
Funded companies at studios with their own funds also raise more, with median external capital of $4.19 million against $1.05 million at single entity studios (Exhibit 30). Funding is concentrated in studios with capital of their own. The four studios with the most funded companies all have dedicated investment capital, three through internal funds and one through a partner fund, and together account for almost half of funded entries, 63 of 132.
January 2019 to September 2026. Median total external capital per funded portfolio entry, including equity, debt and grants, with undisclosed amounts excluded.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal; authors’ analysis.
The fund itself, company selection or the studio’s market could each explain the higher funding rate
| Explanation | Mechanism | Evidence for | Evidence against | Test that would resolve it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The fund itself | A fund lets the studio anchor or co-invest in its companies’ external rounds, gives outside investors an investment committee they can trust, and brings investors to studio companies early. The white paper makes this case for studios with a separate fund on grounds of transparency and diligence. | The difference holds when studios themselves are compared (medians of 50% against 7.8%) and within regions. | Companies whose first round included their own studio raised again less often (37% against 62%). | Compare only companies the studios built, across structures. |
| Company selection | Studios with funds also invest in companies they did not build. The white paper’s benchmark excludes these external companies for this reason, and the portfolio data cannot yet separate them. Part of the difference may come from selecting stronger companies. | The largest portfolio invests in companies it did not build. Without it, the rate for studios with their own funds falls from 52% to 45%, and the second round advantage in Chapter 3 loses significance. Interview evidence describes a studio directing about 70% of its capital into existing businesses. | Even without the largest portfolio, entries at studios with their own funds reach an external round at 45% against 17%. | Tag every company as built, co-created or invested. |
| The studio’s market | A separate fund is costly or legally impractical in some jurisdictions, and the markets where funds are easiest to form tend to have the deepest follow-on capital. Structure may then reflect where the studio formed. The regional adjustment captures differences between regions, not between countries within them. | Funding rates differ by region (38% in the West against 17% in the North), though not significantly once clustering within studios is allowed for. | After adjusting for region, the odds of an external round remain 5.8 times as high as single entity studios. | Record whether a separate fund was legally available to each studio when it formed, and adjust by country. |
Evidence from the deal record (Chapters 3 and 5) and studio interviews.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal; FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter (2026); studio interviews, October 2026; authors’ analysis.
Interview evidence leans towards selection. One studio now directs roughly 70 percent of its capital to existing businesses. Co-creating removes the hardest risk, finding someone to run the business, and fundraising is easier when the studio does not own the whole cap table. Confidential portfolio data shared for this report put companies built from scratch at roughly 2 percent, by value, of the follow-on capital raised across that portfolio. The figures include the studio’s own investment and cannot be generalised across studios, so they set a direction to test rather than a conclusion.
The deal record offers one check against the first explanation in Exhibit 31. Ten of the 27 funded companies whose first round included their own studio or its fund alongside an outside investor have raised again (37%), against 60 of the other 97 (62%, p = 0.03), although the difference does not survive correction for multiple testing (Exhibit 40). Studio co-investment may help companies secure a first round they would otherwise struggle to raise. The lower follow-on rate fits that reading, but the data cannot show whether co-investment bridges companies to outside capital or reflects weaker underlying companies.
Evidence from repeat company building outside Africa is consistent with the difference by structure without resolving its cause. In McKinsey’s 2025 survey of 715 executives, corporations that had built three or more ventures generated 1.9 times revenue per dollar invested before break-even, against 1.3 times for those that had built one or two.25 The survey measures revenue productivity in corporate venture building, not fundraising, and corporate builders differ from independent studios in capital and incentives. It suggests that repetition may matter, and in this sample the studios with the most funded companies are also those with dedicated capital.
Visibility to investors and the ease of investing and exiting also shape fundability
A studio’s own fund is not the only marker of fundability. Two conditions outside the company also bear on it, whether investors can find the studio and whether they can invest in and exit from its companies. Where either fails, a sound company may still struggle to raise.
Recorded funding rates are higher where studios are better documented, so directory-based benchmarks may overstate outcomes
The 27 studios this study adds record an external round for 13 percent of their 123 portfolio entries, against 34 percent of the 341 entries at the 41 studios in published directories (p < 0.001, Exhibit 32). Entries cluster within studios, and the difference is weaker when studios are compared. Seven of the 17 additions with at least three disclosed entries have at least one funded company, against 21 of 28 listed studios, with median funding rates of 0 and 24 percent, but only one of four studio-level tests clears the correction threshold. Neither one portfolio nor structure explains the difference. Listed studios remain at 29 percent without the largest portfolio, and among single entity studios the rates are 19 percent for listed studios and 13 percent for additions.
January 2019 to September 2026. n is the number of portfolio entries. One company listed by a studio in each group counts in both, and removing it leaves both rates unchanged. Published directories are the two Briter publications, the white paper annex and the African Venture Studio Summit Directory 2026.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal; authors’ directory and analysis.
In North Africa, the constraint may be cross-border structure rather than the companies
North African portfolio entries have the lowest recorded funding rate of the four regions, at 17 percent. Neither of the two Tunisian studios has a recorded external round among its ten disclosed portfolio entries. The eight funded companies have raised $4.2 million of disclosed external capital between them, 0.2 percent of the capital traced into studio companies. Tunisia’s 2018 Startup Act has eased capital entry for labelled startups, which may open a foreign currency account, acquire assets abroad or take stakes in foreign companies without prior authorisation.26 Published reporting points to a further possible constraint. GoMyCode, one of Tunisia’s best known startups, moved its headquarters to the Netherlands to raise in euros from investors in Dubai, the United Kingdom and France, and its co-founder described going international for a Tunisian startup as “almost impossible”.27 The African Development Bank describes investors in Egypt asking startups seeking larger rounds to set up an offshore holding company in a jurisdiction offering “better protections and easier transactions”.28 AVCA data put the share of venture deals between 2014 and 2019 that went to African startups headquartered outside Africa at 21 percent.29 The AVCA figure shows that offshore incorporation is common across the continent, but it does not by itself explain North African funding rates.
If offshore holding structures and clear exit routes are prerequisites for some investors, locally incorporated companies may face added barriers to larger rounds regardless of quality, which would point towards examining cross-border investment and exit rules alongside early-stage support. This remains a hypothesis, resting on 47 entries, eight funded companies and published reporting from Tunisia and Egypt, and no North African studio, founder or investor has yet been interviewed.
Studio stakes vary widely and are not recorded
The FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter white paper reports studio stakes from 20 percent to more than 50 percent, with venture-oriented studios generally below 30 percent. The Global Startup Studio Network separately reports an average studio stake of 34 percent, from a different population and method. The most transparent African example, a Côte d’Ivoire studio, publishes terms of 25 percent for an in-kind build valued at €500,000 and a further 12.5 percent for €250,000 in cash from its partner co-investment vehicle. Both published sources give a combined pre-seed stake of 32.5 percent, which the two terms do not reproduce, so the combined stake remains unconfirmed.30
Studio ownership can also affect how outside investors assess the management team and founder incentives. In a survey of 885 institutional venture capitalists, the management team is most often cited as the most important factor, ahead of business model and market.31 Where a studio holds more equity than the founding team, outside investors may question how control and founder incentives are structured, and interview evidence describes a studio moving towards existing businesses partly because fundraising is easier when it does not own the whole cap table. No dataset records studio stakes, so their effect on funding rates cannot yet be tested.
Investors and DFIs can weigh a studio’s own capital now, and ask for the stakes and build routes no dataset records
A studio’s own capital is the marker most consistently associated with reaching an external round, and a signal for investors and development finance institutions to track while evidence on its cause builds (Exhibit 33). Build route and studio stake, which could explain much of the difference it marks, are not yet recorded anywhere, so investors can close the gap at diligence by asking studios for both. The markers support diagnosis rather than prediction, since no weights are estimated and none is shown to cause a company to raise.
| Marker | Finding | Evidence | See |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capital to co-invest | Companies at studios with their own funds reach an external round at 52%, against 17% at single entity studios, and 69% of those funded raise again, against 29% | Qualified | Exhibits 29 and 15 |
| Visibility to investors | Companies at studios in published directories reach an external round at 34%, against 13% at studios not yet listed | Qualified | Exhibit 32 |
| Progression to a second round | Half of funded companies raise again within 24 months, yet 52% have recorded no round in the past two years | Strong | Exhibits 16 and 17 |
| An outside investor in the first round | Companies whose first round did not include their own studio raise again at 62%, against 37% where it did | Indicative | Chapter 5 |
| Sector | Nine of 10 funded logistics companies raised again, against four of 13 in healthcare | Indicative | Exhibit 20 |
| Ease of investing and exiting | Funding rates range from 38% in West Africa to 17% in North Africa, where offshore structuring may be one constraint | Indicative | Exhibit 21 |
| Build route | Not yet recorded across portfolios. Confidential data put companies built from scratch at about 2% of follow-on capital, a figure that cannot be generalised across studios | Untested | Chapter 5 |
| Studio stake | Published stakes range from 20% to more than 50%, and no African dataset records them | Untested | Chapter 5 |
Evidence grades follow the definitions in Annex E, and significance tests are in Exhibit 40.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal; studio interviews, October 2026; sources cited in this chapter; authors’ analysis.
A studio’s own capital matters at the first external round and again at the second. It marks which studios’ companies reach a first external round, and Chapter 6 shows that the follow-on advantage sits there too, with 69 percent of funded companies at studios with their own funds raising again, against 28 percent of other startups. That pattern supports the white paper’s central finding once companies have raised.
Notes
FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter (2026), Chapter 5 and Table 3.↩︎
McKinsey & Company, “The way to win in corporate venturing: Serial building and AI” (October 2025). Online survey of 715 senior executives at companies with annual revenue above $100 million, May 2025.↩︎
Republic of Tunisia, Startup Act (Law 2018-20), benefits for labelled startups, https://startup.gov.tn/en/startup_act/benefits_to_Startups.↩︎
Launch Base Africa, “Will funding finally flow to Tunisian startups? New foreign currency rules challenge the status quo” (26 November 2024), quoting Yahya Bouhlel, co-founder of GoMyCode. The same article reports a proposed provision in Tunisia’s 2025 finance law that would allow residents to open foreign currency accounts.↩︎
African Development Bank, Entrepreneurship in Egypt Case Study: Policy Recommendation to Reverse Establishment of Startups Outside Egypt (28 March 2024).↩︎
Launch Base Africa, “Africa Incorporated: Is it time to domesticate the Delaware flip?” (21 January 2026), citing AVCA data.↩︎
FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter, Venture Studios in Africa (2026), Chapters 1 and 3. Global Startup Studio Network, GSSN Data Report (2022). Launch Base Africa, “The diaspora founder formula behind Côte d’Ivoire’s most prolific venture studio” (24 February 2026). TechCabal, “Can a Lagos tech idea work in Abidjan? Mstudio is betting on this” (15 September 2025).↩︎
P. Gompers, W. Gornall, S. Kaplan and I. Strebulaev, “How do venture capitalists make decisions?”, Journal of Financial Economics 135(1), 2020, 169 to 190.↩︎
