The first external round is where most studio companies fall away. Fewer than three in ten have one on record. Those that do tend to keep raising, with about three in five reaching each later round, and funded studio companies raise a second round within 24 months more often than other startups. Most recorded capital goes to a few late rounds, while the largest loss of companies comes before any outside investor arrives.
Africa: The Big Deal records at least one external round for 124 of the 456 portfolio companies, a recorded funding rate of 27.2 percent. Among companies with a recorded first external round, progression is steadier, with 70 raising at least two rounds, 45 at least three and 28 at least four, so about 60 percent reach the next round at each step (Exhibit 11).
456 companies in the disclosed portfolios of 49 studios, each counted once, by number of external rounds, January 2019 to September 2026. Percentages: share of companies at the previous stage reaching the next.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
The headline rate holds under alternative definitions of an external round, staying between 26.3 and 28.9 percent (Exhibit 12). The two widest swings, counting studio-only rounds as external and treating two studio-linked investors as part of that studio, each move eight companies or fewer and alter no comparison in the report.
Share of the 456 portfolio companies with at least one external round, under five counting rules defined in Annex A.3. Bars count companies, so the 132 at 28.9% matches the 132 funded portfolio entries in Chapter 2 only by coincidence.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
Portfolio funding rates converge with the benchmark after the first round
Measured the same way as Briter’s benchmark, 27.2 percent of portfolio companies have a recorded first external round, 15.4 percent a second and 9.9 percent a third, against 40, 22 and 9 percent in the FMO-hosted edition of the white paper and 49, 28 and 14 percent in the second edition (Exhibit 13). 12 The gap is widest at the first round, at 12.8 to 21.8 percentage points, and closes by the third, where portfolio companies range from 0.9 percentage points ahead to 4.1 behind. Once companies have raised, the rates align: 56 percent of companies here reach a second round after a first, against 55 and 57 percent in the two editions. The difference lies in reaching the first round.
Briter: follow-on rounds after studio support, 2016 to 2025. This report: share of all 456 portfolio companies with one, two and three external rounds, January 2019 to September 2026
Sources: FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter (2026), Figure 5, Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
The gap compares two different measures, so it does not indicate underperformance. They differ in population, build route, data source and period. Two of these differences may lift this report’s rate. Portfolios include companies studios backed, which may raise more readily than those they built, and failed ventures may have dropped off studio websites. The deal record may lower it, as it omits rounds below $100,000, and below higher thresholds before 2021, so some small first rounds that Briter records may be missing here. Any record built from disclosures can also miss companies that closed early, as the white paper notes. None of these effects can be measured, so part of the first-round gap may reflect differences in what each source records.
Once funded, studio companies raise a second round more often than other startups
Funded studio companies raise a second round more often than other funded startups. Among 80 studio companies whose first recorded round closed between January 2021 and September 2024, 48 percent raised again within 24 months, against 28 percent of 1,612 startups with no recorded connection to the 68 studios (Exhibit 14). Allowing for region and first round year, their odds of a second round are 2.21 times as high (95% confidence interval 1.39 to 3.52).13 The difference stays significant at the 5 percent level when companies are clustered by studio (p = 0.006), but not after correction for multiple testing (Exhibit 40). The 28 percent for other startups is consistent with the white paper’s finding that nearly 70 percent of African ventures do not secure follow-on funding after their first round.14
The comparison is confined to companies that have already raised. No dataset records startups that never raised or that closed, and launch years exist only for funded companies, so entry, survival and time to first funding cannot be compared. Funded studio companies raise again more often, and whether studio support drives that advantage is the question Chapter 9 sets out to test.
Share of funded companies raising a second round within 24 months, first rounds January 2021 to September 2024. Gap: studio rate minus outside rate, in percentage points. Mantel-Haenszel odds ratios stratified by region and first round year, plus sector where shown. Light purple: not statistically significant (confidence interval includes 1). Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
Share of funded companies raising a second round within 24 months, first rounds January 2021 to September 2024, with n the cohort size. A company listed by studios of two structures appears in both rows. The other 19 cohort companies sit with hybrid, sidecar fund, corporate embedded and unclassified studios.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
The advantage holds for early-stage first rounds, companies launched since 2019 and companies in the same sector, so later entry or faster-moving sectors are unlikely to explain it (Exhibit 14). It is concentrated in studios with their own funds, whose companies raised again at 69 percent, against 29 percent at single entity studios, close to the 28 percent for other startups (Exhibit 15). It also leans on the largest portfolio, which holds 21 of the 80 cohort companies and whose fund backs companies the studio did not build. Excluding it lowers the studio rate to 39 percent and the odds ratio to 1.60 (95% confidence interval 0.93 to 2.77, unclustered p = 0.12), which is no longer significant.
Studio selection may account for part of the advantage
Studios filter their portfolios before any investor sees them. Those in the white paper report dropping about 80 percent of ideas before operation, and 15 to 20 percent of operating ventures still fail. 15 The cohorts also start from different points. Studio companies are more often West African (44 percent against 35 percent of other startups), more often began with a pre-seed or seed round (50 percent against 29 percent) and less often with a grant (6 percent against 18 percent).
The comparison controls for region and stage, but not for what a studio sees before it builds.
Accelerator research separates selection from support only where admission was by lottery or score cutoff. In Start-Up Chile, cash and workspace alone made no measurable difference to later fundraising, while structured training did.16 The Global Accelerator Learning Initiative, which follows more than 4,210 accelerated and rejected ventures, finds that accelerated ventures grow faster, though those in emerging markets still attract less equity and debt.17 No African studio dataset yet supports such a design, so the report does not attribute the difference to studio support. Studios that record the ventures they considered and declined would make the test possible.
Funded studio companies launched since 2019 took a median of two years to reach a first external round
Launch years are recorded only for companies with funding records, so the two-year median, based on 78 companies, describes those that reached investors and may not represent the wider portfolio. Funded companies that raise again do so a median of 13 months after their first external round, and half of the 102 with at least 24 months of record have a second round within 24 months (Exhibit 16). This exceeds the 48 percent for the 2021 to 2024 cohort because it includes first rounds from 2019 and 2020.
Cumulative share of funded studio companies with a second external round, among companies whose first round is at least 12, 24 or 36 months before September 2026 (117, 102 and 88 companies).
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
More than half of funded studio companies have no recorded round in the past two years
Sixty-four of the 124 funded companies (52%) have recorded no external round in the 24 months to September 2026, including two thirds of those that raised only once (36 of 54). Excluding the three acquired companies, the share is 50 percent (61 of 121). Recorded dormancy is lower among companies of studios with their own funds than among those of single entity studios, at 43 and 60 percent, but the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.14, Exhibit 17). In the follow-on comparison cohort defined earlier, 64 percent of studio companies have recorded no round since September 2024, against 84 percent of other startups.
Share of funded companies with no external round in the 24 months to September 2026, by studio structure. A company listed by studios of both structures appears in both rows, and acquired companies are included. Grey bar: overall rate. Dormancy means no recorded round, and a dormant company may still be profitable, acquired without disclosure or funded below the reporting threshold.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
The pipeline therefore thins after entry as well as at it. One possible reason, examined in Chapter 4, is that the investors who write early cheques rarely reappear in later rounds.
Capital is concentrated in a few companies, late rounds and debt
Capital is concentrated in a few companies, so totals overstate the typical outcome and the analysis rests on rates and medians. Moove and Flutterwave account for 50.2 percent of the $2.45 billion traced into the 124 funded companies, and five companies for 64.0 percent. The median funded company has raised $2.0 million in total, in rounds with a median of $1.0 million. Studio companies also enter with larger first rounds, at a median of $500,000 against $200,000 for other startups in the comparison cohort. Recorded rounds peaked at 62 in 2022 and fell to 44 in 2025.
Studio companies are 4.9 percent of funded African companies in the deal record but take 7.1 percent of rounds and 10.9 percent of capital, more than twice their share by number, though two companies account for half of that capital (Exhibit 18). They form a small but capital-intensive part of a market in which almost 500 startups raised rounds of $100,000 or more in 2025 alone.18
Studio companies’ share of all funded African companies, rounds and disclosed capital in the deal record, January 2019 to September 2026, excluding mergers and acquisitions. Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
Most capital arrives after the first cheque. The 127 grant, pre-seed and seed rounds carry $180 million, 7.4 percent of the capital traced, while 13 rounds at Series B and later, raised by eight companies, carry $1.13 billion, or 46 percent (Exhibit 19).
Debt accounts for a fifth of the total, with 49 rounds raised by 18 companies carrying $502 million, concentrated in energy and mobility businesses, where debt can finance physical assets. The first equity investor and the largest financier of those companies can be different institutions with different mandates. In the wider African technology market, debt accounted for 41 percent of recorded funding in 2025 on Partech’s method.19
The 316 external rounds of the 124 funded studio companies, January 2019 to September 2026, with each group’s share of the $2.45 billion traced. Debt and grants are grouped by instrument, equity by stage. Stage not recorded: rounds the source labels only as venture rounds. Amounts include 64 source estimates, and six rounds have none disclosed.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
Studio companies hold a similar share of each sector, but second-round rates vary widely between sectors
Sector is recorded only for companies that have raised, so sector funding rates cannot be computed and comparisons cover funded companies only. Studio companies make up 4 to 6 percent of funded African companies in most sectors of the deal record, and 7.9 percent in energy and water.
Second-round rates vary far more. Nine of the ten funded logistics companies have recorded a second round, against eight of 12 in agriculture, 23 of 37 in fintech and four of 13 in healthcare (Exhibit 20). Fintech is the largest sector, with $899 million, while Deep tech and waste management are almost absent. Moove alone accounts for $672 million of the $788 million raised in logistics, so a sector’s capital total can reflect a single company.
Share of funded studio companies with a second external round, by sector as recorded at the first round, January 2019 to September 2026. Sectors with fewer than ten funded companies are omitted.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
Funding rates are highest at West African studios, though the differences between regions could be due to chance
Portfolio entries at West African studios reach an external round at 38 percent, against 25 to 26 percent in East and Southern Africa and 17 percent in North Africa (Exhibit 21). The differences are significant when each entry is counted separately (p = 0.015), but not once entries are grouped by studio (p = 0.69), so they could be due to chance. Côte d’Ivoire records the highest rate, 54 percent, on a small base of seven of 13 entries, all from one studio’s standard pre-seed package (Chapter 4), and Nigeria follows at 37 percent. The weight of Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Egypt in the sample mirrors the wider market, where these four countries took 72 percent of African tech funding in 2025.20 Chapters 4 and 5 examine who writes the first external cheque and which studios attract it.
Share of portfolio entries with at least one external round, by the studio’s region and country of headquarters, with the number of portfolio entries in brackets. Countries with ten or more portfolio entries are shown.
Sources: Africa: The Big Deal and authors’ analysis.
Notes
FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter (2026), Figure 5, p. 26. The two circulating editions give different values in this figure. Both describe the first rate as “one in two”, neither states its release order, and this report treats both as authoritative.↩︎
Authors’ analysis of Africa: The Big Deal data. Annex A.4 sets out the method and the adjustment for multiple testing.↩︎
FMO, GIZ SAIS and Briter (2026), Executive summary, p. 5, and Figure 2, p. 19.↩︎
J. González-Uribe and M. Leatherbee, “The effects of business accelerators on venture performance: evidence from Start-Up Chile”, The Review of Financial Studies 31(4), 2018, pp. 1566 to 1603. See also S. Yu, “How do accelerators impact the performance of high-technology ventures?”, Management Science 66(2), 2020, pp. 530 to 552, and B. Hallen, S. Cohen and C. Bingham, “Do accelerators work? If so, how?”, Organization Science 31(2), 2020, pp. 378 to 414.↩︎
Porticus, “Lessons from the Global Accelerator Learning Initiative (GALI)” (2022), summarising data held by the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs on more than 15,900 enterprises and 222 programmes, of which more than 4,210 accelerated and rejected ventures were followed up.↩︎
Africa: The Big Deal, “2025 in review” (January 2026). Partech records $4.1 billion for 2025 on a different method that includes debt (footnote 19).↩︎
Partech, 2025 Africa Tech Venture Capital Report (January 2026), which records $4.1 billion raised across equity ($2.41 billion) and debt ($1.64 billion). Partech reports debt as 41% of the total, and the rounded components shown here give about 40%.↩︎
